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Abstract
Early in 2013, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“ECJ”) handed down two judgments on the same day which might contain the blueprint for the fundamental rights architecture
of the European Union (“EU”) for years to come. Much has already been written about those
judgments, and it appears appropriate at this time to evaluate their impact in light of their reception and subsequent developments of the case law. To that effect, this contribution will provide
some elements of background before briefly presenting the two cases, commenting on their legal
solidity, and recalling how they have been received. It will then turn to a critical analysis of the
arguments that are most commonly made in favor and against a broad scope of EU fundamental
rights. As will be shown, the ECJ has taken a number of these arguments into account in its case
law. A final part will evaluate the tools that are available to police the boundaries between EU and
national fundamental rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Early in 2013, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(“ECJ”) handed down two judgments on the same day which might
contain the blueprint for the fundamental rights architecture of the
European Union (“EU”) for years to come. Much has already been
written about those judgments, and it appears appropriate at this time
to evaluate their impact in light of their reception and subsequent
developments of the case law. To that effect, this contribution will
provide some elements of background before briefly presenting the
two cases, commenting on their legal solidity, and recalling how they
have been received. It will then turn to a critical analysis of the
arguments that are most commonly made in favor and against a broad
scope of EU fundamental rights. As will be shown, the ECJ has taken
a number of these arguments into account in its case law. A final part
will evaluate the tools that are available to police the boundaries
between EU and national fundamental rights.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of Fundamental Rights in EU law
From the late 1960s1 until the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty in December 2009, the main legally-binding source of
1. Stauder v. City of Ulm, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419, is most commonly cited as the
origin. See Bruno de Witte, The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the
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fundamental rights in the EU legal order were the general principles
of EU law, which were derived from international conventions to
which the EU Member States were parties, in particular the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and from the constitutional
traditions common to the Member States.2 It was the task of the ECJ
to identify those general principles in its case law.
The Lisbon Treaty added a binding Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (“Charter”), giving it the same legal
value as the Treaties.3 The Lisbon Treaty also foresees an obligation
for the EU to become a party to the ECHR, and the ECJ recently
delivered its opinion on the compatibility of a draft accession
agreement4 with the Treaties, holding that the draft agreement was, on
a whole series of grounds, not compatible with the Treaties.5
B. The scope of Union fundamental rights before the Lisbon Treaty
Both the general principles and the Charter are meant primarily
to restrict EU institutions. That application today is largely
uncontroversial, in particular because that dimension of fundamental
rights means that there will be less interference with the powers of the
Member States. Things look different, however, when it comes to
applying those fundamental rights in order to constrain Member
States. Member State action is already limited by the fundamental
rights laid down in each State’s national legal order.6 The fact that

Protection of Human Rights, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 859, 867 (Philip Alston ed.,
1999).
2. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und
Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1126; J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v.
Commission of the European Communities, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 492; Hauer v. Land
Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3729.
3. A first version of the Charter had been proclaimed at Nice in December 2000. See
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. C 364/1. But it only acquired
the status of the highest-ranking law of the Union with the Lisbon Treaty, by virtue of the
reference in Article 6(1). See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6(1),
2012 O.J. C 326/13 [hereinafter TEU].
4. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FIFTH NEGOTIATION MEETING BETWEEN THE CDDH AD
HOC NEGOTIATION GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE ACCESSION OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2013), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1%282013
%29008rev2_EN.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
5. Opinion 2/13, [2014] E.C.R. I____ (delivered Dec. 18, 2014) (not yet reported).
6. See generally FEDERICO FABBRINI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: CHALLENGES
AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 6-25 (2014); AIDA TORRES PÉREZ,
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States need to accept that fundamental rights imposed through EU
membership create additional limits to what they are allowed to do is
an important issue of federal distribution of powers.7
One justification for applying EU-based fundamental rights to
the Member States is that in certain situations, Member States are in
fact not acting on their own behalf, but rather as agents for the EU.
Indeed, EU legislation is as a rule implemented by the Member
States.8 Where Member State action gives effect to EU rules, it must
respect EU fundamental rights. The ECJ handed down a number of
decisions in that sense starting in the late 1980s,9 and the Member
States by and large seem to have accepted that line of cases.
In addition, the ECJ has taken the position, starting in ERT,10
that Union fundamental rights also apply to the Member States when
they act within the scope of Union law, arguably a much broader and
at the outset less clear concept.11 It has mostly been used to refer to
situations in which Member States wanted to derogate from one of the
freedoms of the internal market.
Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights specifically
addresses this issue. It foresees, in relevant part, that the provisions of
the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are
implementing EU law. It is arguable that, by this drafting, the authors
wanted to limit the application of the Charter to situations of
implementation in a narrow sense.12 Some of the drafters, however,
CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A THEORY OF SUPRANATIONAL
ADJUDICATION 13-26 (2009).
7. See generally Piet Eeckhout, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal
Question, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 945 (2002); Allard Knook, The Court, the Charter, and
the Vertical Division of Powers in the European Union, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 367
(2005); Aida Torres Pérez, The Dual System of Rights Protection in the European Union in
Light of US Federalism, in FEDERALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 110, 113-15 (Elke Cloots
et al. eds., 2012).
8. Eeckhout, supra note 7, at 952; see Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union art. 291, 2012 O.J. C 336/47 [hereinafter TFEU].
9. This line of cases started with Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und
Forstwirtschaft, Case 5/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2609. See, e.g., Francis Jacobs, Wachauf and the
Protection of Fundamental Rights in EC Law, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW: THE
CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY 133
(Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loïc Azoulai eds., 2010).
10. ERT v. DEP, Case C-260/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-2925; see also Zdeněk Kühn, Wachauf
and ERT: On the Road from the Centralised to the Decentralised System of Judicial Review, in
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW, supra note 9, at 151.
11. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 9, at 137-38 (voicing criticism).
12. On the drafting history, see Eeckhout, supra note 7, at 954-58; Clemens
Ladenburger, European Union Institutional Report, in REPORTS OF THE XXV FIDE
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insisted on the explanation to that Article13 making it clear that
implementing EU law also covered the broader concept of the
Member States acting within the scope of EU law.
The Lisbon Treaty has thus accentuated an existing problem. It
has, on the one hand, given fundamental rights a more prominent
place, making it more likely that individuals will invoke them,
including against the Member States.14 On the other hand, the
limitation in Article 51(1) of the Charter is now also very visible.15
The Lisbon Treaty has, therefore, raised conflicting expectations.16
C. The Enforcement of EU Law in the Member States
An expansive application of EU fundamental rights to the
Member States may lead to a shift of power within the Member
States’ judicial systems. EU law in general is enforced by the Member
States, in particular through the national courts. The founding treaties,
as interpreted by the ECJ, empower any national court to exercise
judicial review over a Member State’s law by setting aside that law as
a violation of provisions of EU law, including EU fundamental
rights.17 For the purpose of EU law, there is thus a generalized system
of judicial review.18
CONGRESS TALLINN 2012, 141, 160-61 (Julia Laffranque ed., 2012); Daniel Sarmiento, Who's
Afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National Courts and the New Framework of
Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1267, 1275-76 (2013);
Daniel Thym, Separation versus Fusion - or: How to Accommodate National Autonomy and
the Charter? Diverging Visions of the German Constitutional Court and the European Court
of Justice, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 391, 393-94 (2013); Angela Ward, Article 51, in THE EU
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 1424, 1425 (Steve Peers et al. eds.,
2014).
13. On their status and legal value, see Jean-Paul Jacqué, The Explanations Relating to
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in THE EU CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 1715, 1720.
14. Sarmiento, supra note 12, at 1270. See generally Alec Stone Sweet, The European
Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance, 5 LIVING REVIEWS IN EUROPEAN
GOVERNANCE No. 2 (2010).
15. See Sara Iglesias Sánchez, The Court and the Charter: the Impact of the Entry into
Force of the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s Approach to Fundamental Rights, 49 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 1565, 1583-85 (2012).
16. See, e.g., Eeckhout, supra note 7, at 957-58 (discussing this paradox).
17. See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, Case 106/77, [1978]
E.C.R. 629; see also Michal Bobek, The Impact of the European Mandate of Ordinary Courts
on the Position of Constitutional Courts, in CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS IN EUROPE:
ACTORS, TOPICS AND PROCEDURES 287 (Monica Claes et al. eds., 2012); Jan Komárek, The
Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 420, 428 (2013); Aida
Torres Pérez, The Challenges for Constitutional Courts as Guardians of Fundamental Rights
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Judicial review over Member State acts that allegedly violate a
national fundamental right, by contrast, is often19 reserved to
specialized national constitutional courts.20 When an ordinary court of
law in a Member State comes across an issue of national fundamental
rights, it normally has to defer to the constitutional court.
Given the primacy of EU law over national law and the
possibility for all national courts to take up issues of EU law, it may
be quite appealing for the ordinary courts of law in the Member States
to discover issues involving the application of EU fundamental rights.
By doing so, they become constitutional courts.21 At the same time,
however, if it is possible to invoke EU fundamental rights instead of
national fundamental rights on a big scale, national constitutional
courts might perceive their role to be threatened.22
II. WHAT HAS THE ECJ DONE SINCE LISBON?
After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the ECJ started by
interpreting the scope of EU fundamental rights rather cautiously.23 In
particular, in a series of decisions on EU citizenship and third-country
nationals,24 the ECJ clarified that third-country nationals that were
family members of EU citizens were not automatically under the
protection of EU law. These third-country nationals could not,
therefore, necessarily invoke a right to family life under EU law in
order to obtain a right to live and work in a Member State.
in the European Union, in THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN MULTILEVEL
GOVERNANCE 49, 50-53 (Patricia Popelier et al. eds., 2013).
18. See Alec Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and
Rights Adjudication in Europe, 1 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 53, 64 (2012).
19. But not always. For an overview, see Komárek, supra note 17, at 423 n.14.
20. See generally Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe Rejected American Judicial Review –
and Why it May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2765-69 (2002-2003).
21. See, e.g., Irmgard Griss (Former President of the Austrian Supreme Court), Die neue
Rolle der Höchstgerichte, in DIE ÖSTERREICHISCHEN HÖCHSTGERICHTE UND DIE
EUROPÄISCHEN GERICHTSHÖFE ZWISCHEN RECHT, WIRTSCHAFT UND POLITIK 37, 38 (Josef
Marko & Wolfgang Schleifer eds., 2012); cf. Karen Alter, The European Court’s Political
Power, 19 WEST EUR. POLITICS 458, 466-71 (1996); Marta Cartabia, Europe and Rights:
Taking Dialogue Seriously, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 5, 29 (2009).
22. Bobek, supra note 17, at 291-92; Komárek, supra note 17, at 427-32, Torres Pérez,
supra note 17, at 56-57. But see Sarmiento, supra note 12, at 1298 (claiming that their position
within the state might be strengthened).
23. See, for a thorough overview, Iglesias Sánchez, supra note 15, at 1583-96.
24. McCarthy v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Case C-434/09, [2011]
E.C.R. I-3375; Dereci and Others v. Bundesministerium für Inneres, Case C-256/11, [2011]
E.C.R. I-11315; Iida v. Stadt Ulm, Case C-40/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:691.
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By contrast, in Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal25 and Åklagaren v.
Åkerberg Fransson,26 the ECJ seemed determined to set out more
general principles on the scope of EU fundamental rights. In Melloni,
the defendant, Mr. Melloni, was pursued for bankruptcy fraud in Italy.
He remained in Spain, jumped bail, and was finally sentenced in
absentia in Italy to ten years in prison. In addition, Italy issued a
European arrest warrant against him. Four years later, he was found in
Spain, and the following issue arose:
The rules on the European arrest warrant, which are laid down in
EU legislation,27 contain a possibility for the executing judicial
authority to refuse the execution of the arrest warrant if the defendant
did not appear in person at the trial, except in certain situations. One
of the justifications for still executing the arrest warrant is that the
person has been defended by a legal counselor who he has instructed
to appear on his behalf. Mr. Melloni had instructed a lawyer to defend
him. The Spanish Constitutional Court, which referred the case to the
ECJ, pointed out that under the Spanish Constitution, it was essential
for a defendant to be able to challenge a conviction in absentia in
order to safeguard his rights of defense.
The ECJ held that the EU fundamental right to a fair trial
included the possibility for the accused to waive the right to be
present where he had given a mandate to a legal counselor to defend
him. The EU rules on the European arrest warrant were therefore
found to be in line with the EU fundamental rights at issue.28 The ECJ
went on to say that the application of a more generous right to a fair
trial, namely that the person convicted in absentia needed to have a
legal remedy in the Member State issuing the arrest warrant, as was
apparently required under Spanish constitutional law, would
undermine the primacy and effectiveness of EU law and could
therefore not be allowed.29
With regard to the relationship between the Charter and a
national constitutional rule granting greater protection to the
25. Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, Case C-399/11, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Feb.
26, 2013) (not yet reported).
26. Åklagaren v. Åkerberg Fransson, Case C-617/10, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered
Feb. 26, 2013) (not yet reported).
27. Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the
surrender procedures between Member States, 2002 O.J. L 190/1, as amended by Council
Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, 2009 O.J. L 81/24.
28. Melloni, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Feb. 26, 2013), ¶¶ 49-50.
29. Id. ¶¶ 58-59.
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defendant, the ECJ held that, even though Article 53 of the Charter
provides in essence that the Charter shall not lower the standards
protected by other sources of fundamental rights, including national
constitutions, a Member State was not allowed to apply a national
fundamental right in a situation that was fully harmonized by Union
law and in which the Charter rights were respected.30 In a situation of
that kind, the fundamental rights foreseen in EU law may therefore
come to function as a ceiling.31
The second case, Åkerberg Fransson, concerned tax fraud
allegedly committed by a Swedish fisherman which implicated value
added tax (“VAT”). The Swedish authorities applied administrative
sanctions to the defendant, Mr. Åkerberg Fransson, and also instituted
criminal proceedings. A Swedish district court asked the ECJ whether
a criminal sanction would violate the fisherman’s right not to be tried
or punished twice.
The ECJ could only look into that question if the right not to be
tried or punished twice, which is laid down in the Charter, applied to
that case at all. The question was thus whether a Member State who
was punishing a taxpayer for tax fraud was implementing EU law.
The substantive rules on VAT are harmonized at the EU level.32 As
far as sanctions are concerned, by contrast, Union law only imposes
obligations on the Member States to do what is necessary for the
correct collection of the tax and for the prevention of evasion.
As distinct from a number of Member States that had made
submissions in that case, the European Commission and the Advocate
General,33 the ECJ took the view that that was enough to say that the
rules on administrative and criminal sanctions of tax fraud were an
implementation of Union law. In interpreting Article 51(1) of the
Charter, the ECJ held that the applicability of EU law entailed the
applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.34
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the ECJ found that
every Member State was under an obligation to take all legislative
30. Id. ¶¶ 63-64.
31. Fabbrini, supra note 6, at 41; Emily Hancox, The Meaning of “Implementing” EU
Law Under Article 51(1) of the Charter: Åkerberg Fransson, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1411,
1428 (2013).
32. Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax, 2006 O.J.
L 347/1.
33. Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Åklagaren v. Åkerberg Fransson, Case
C-617/10, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered June 6, 2012) (not yet reported).
34. Åkerberg Fransson, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Feb. 26, 2013), ¶ 21.
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and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all
the VAT due on its territory and for preventing evasion. It followed
that tax penalties and criminal proceedings for tax evasion concerning
VAT constituted implementation of EU law for the purposes of
Article 51(1) of the Charter.35
However, the ECJ added that, in a situation where Member State
action is not entirely determined by EU law, national authorities and
courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of
fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for
by the Charter and the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law
are not thereby compromised.36 In a situation of that kind, therefore,
EU fundamental rights play the role of a floor of protection.37
III. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW CASE LAW
A. Reception
The reception of the two judgments quoted was rather mixed. In
fact, even though Melloni might be considered as the more serious
intervention in national law, hardly any fundamental criticism appears
to have been voiced against it.38 Primacy of EU law, even where it
displaces national fundamental rights, seems to be generally accepted.
First, in Melloni, the ECJ could rely on case law dating more than
forty years back.39 Second, the rules on the European arrest warrant
were specifically designed to harmonize the right to a fair trial at the
EU level, in compliance with EU fundamental rights. The application
of higher national standards would undermine the goal of
harmonization. Third, Article 53 of the Charter does not change that
result.40 That provision is limited to providing that nothing in the
Charter shall be interpreted as restricting, inter alia, human rights as

35. Id. ¶¶ 25-27.
36. Id. ¶ 29.
37. Fabbrini, supra note 6, at 40; Hancox, supra note 31, at 1428.
38. Even though it must be noted that the Spanish Constitutional Court certainly did not
embrace the ECJ’s decision wholeheartedly. See S.T.C., Feb. 13, 2014 (B.J.C. No. 26/2014)
(Spain); see also Aida Torres Pérez, Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue, 10
EUR. CONST. L. REV. 308 (2014).
39. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, ¶ 3.
40. For a different view, see Nikos Lavranos, The ECJ’s Judgments in Melloni and
Åkerberg Fransson: Une ménage à trois difficulté, EUR. L. REP. 133, 140 (2013).
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recognized by the Member States' constitutions.41 That does not
mean, however, that rules of EU law other than the Charter may not
preclude the application of more generous human rights.42 Those
other rules include fully harmonized secondary legislation as well as
the principles of primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law.
Åkerberg Fransson, by contrast, has been quite severely
criticized, not only in academic writings,43 but also in judicial
opinions. Barely two months after that judgment, the German Federal
Constitutional Court (“GFCC”) took the opportunity to send out a
rather stark warning to the ECJ. In a judgment44 which it had
accompanied by a press release in German and English, the GFCC
essentially said that the German Anti-Terrorism Database Act did not
constitute an implementation of EU law within the meaning of Article
51(1) of the Charter. According to the press release, which was
worded even more strongly than the judgment itself:
Thus, the European fundamental rights are from the outset not
applicable. The European Court of Justice’s decision in the case
Åkerberg Fransson does not change this conclusion. As part of a
cooperative relationship, this decision must not be read in a way
that would view it as an apparent ultra vires act or as if it
endangered the protection and enforcement of the fundamental
rights in the member states in a way that questioned the identity
of the Basic Law’s constitutional order. The Senate acts on the
assumption that the statements in the ECJ’s decision are based on
the distinctive features of the law on value added tax, and express
no general view.

This is strong language, cautioning the ECJ against a broadening
of the approach taken in Åkerberg Fransson. It is not altogether
41. By laying down human rights with a certain content in the Charter, the authors did
not want to diminish the content of other human rights granted by the Member States. See
generally Jonas Bering Liisberg, Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights threaten the
supremacy of Community law?, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1171 (2001).
42. For a similar account, see Bruno de Witte, Art. 53, in THE EU CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 12, ¶ 53.17-53.26; see also Koen Lenaerts, Exploring the
Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 8 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 375, 398-99 (2012).
43. See, e.g., Filippo Fontanelli, Hic Sunt Nationes: The Elusive Limits of the EU
Charter and the German Constitutional Watchdog, 9 EUR.CONST. L. REV. 315 (2013); Dieter
Grimm, Der Datenschutz vor einer Neuorientierung, 68 JURISTENZEITUNG 585, 590-91
(2013); Thorsten Kingreen, Die Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes im europäischen
Grundrechtsföderalismus, 68 JURISTENZEITUNG 801 (2013); Hans-Jürgen Rabe,
Grundrechtsbindung der Mitgliedstaaten, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1407 (2013).
44. Case 1 BvR 1215/07, delivered Apr. 24, 2013, BVerfGE 133, 277 – Anti-Terrorism
Database Act, ¶¶ 88-91.
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surprising that this warning comes from the GFCC. That court, in the
early days of the Federal Republic, firmly established itself as the
guarantor of fundamental rights in a series of decisions that could at
the time be perceived to be as daring as some of the foundational
judgments of the ECJ.45 More than any other court, the GFCC may
therefore see its position threatened by competing claims of
jurisdiction over fundamental rights.
In the United Kingdom, the House of Commons European
Scrutiny Committee, disagreeing not only with much of the evidence
presented to it, but also with the UK Government, questioned the
legitimacy of the EJC’s approach in Åkerberg Fransson.46 It is
therefore worth analyzing, firstly, whether the criticism of the ECJ's
interpretation of the scope of EU fundamental rights is justified and,
secondly, what the ECJ did, if anything, to take the wind out of the
sails of its critics.
B. Legal Accuracy of the ECJ’s Ruling in Åkerberg Fransson
In its judgment, the ECJ did three things that are of interest for
the present purpose: it set out the test for determining whether EU
fundamental rights applied; it applied that test to the case at hand; and
it applied the fundamental right at issue while leaving to the national
court the application of a potentially more generous national
fundamental right.
With regard to the scope of EU fundamental rights, the ECJ took
the view that Article 51(1) of the Charter confirmed its case law
relating to the extent to which actions of the Member States must
comply with the requirements flowing from EU fundamental rights.47
While the reasoning on this point was certainly not abundant, the
result was unsurprising. Article 6(3) TEU maintains the earlier rule
that fundamental rights derived from the common constitutional
principles of the Member States and from international agreements to
which they were parties apply as general principles of EU law. In
45. On the scope of fundamental rights review in Germany, see generally Donald P.
Kommers, German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMORY L.J. 837 (1991);
Wolfgang Zeidler, Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany:
Decisions on the Constitutionality of Legal Norms, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 504 (1986-1987).
46. House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, The application of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights in the UK: a state of confusion, 43rd Report of Session 2013–
14, ¶ 167.
47. Åkerberg Fransson, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Feb. 26, 2013), ¶ 18.

1108 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38:1097
light of the intention of the authors of the Treaties to continue
applying fundamental rights as general principles without any
indication that their scope should be more limited than under the
ECJ’s well-known case law, it would seem quite odd to give the
Charter a more limited scope.48
The ECJ then invoked essentially two arguments to demonstrate
that the case at hand came within the scope of EU law. First, a
Member State is under an obligation to take all legislative and
administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the
VAT due on its territory and for preventing evasion. Second, Article
325 TFEU obliges the Member States to counter illegal activities
affecting the financial interests of the EU through effective deterrent
measures and, in particular, obliges Member States to take the same
measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the EU
as they take to counter fraud affecting their own interests. Given that
the EU’s own resources include revenue from application of a
uniform rate to the harmonized VAT assessment bases determined
according to EU rules, there is thus a direct link between the
collection of VAT revenue in compliance with the EU law applicable
and the availability to the EU budget of the corresponding VAT
resources.49
One might add that the Lisbon Treaty included in Article 291(1)
TFEU a provision according to which Member States shall adopt all
measures of national law necessary to implement legally binding
Union acts. That provision was written into the Treaty to emphasize
the broad responsibility of Member States to implement Union law,
even in the absence of specific rules to that effect in Union
legislation. Where Member States exercise that responsibility, they
may retain a significant amount of discretion, but what they do is still
to some extent determined by Union law. The corollary of not giving
up more discretion is a duty to act within the parameters fixed by the
general principles of Union law and by Union fundamental rights.
The ECJ’s case law prior to the entry into force of the LisbonTreaty also contains a number of useful indications. In Steffensen, a
case concerning the interpretation of a EU rule on the official control
of foodstuffs which gives operators subject to an inspection a right to
48. See, e.g., Paul Craig, written evidence provided to the HOUSE OF COMMONS
EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, supra note 46; Ladenburger, supra note 12, at 164-65;
Ward, supra note 12, ¶ 51.40.
49. Åkerberg Fransson, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Feb. 26, 2013), ¶¶ 25-26.
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a second opinion,50 the ECJ not only reiterated its earlier decisions
according to which the reliance on a right stemming from EU law
before the national courts is bolstered by the principles of equivalence
and effectiveness, but also addressed the question of the consequences
it would have on the admissibility of evidence if the right to a second
opinion was infringed. That question raised broader issues of the
fundamental right to a fair trial, which the ECJ decided to address in
that case.
In Sopropé, which the ECJ quoted in Åkerberg Fransson without
relying on the most relevant element of that judgment, the ECJ had
taken the view that the authorities of the Member States were required
to respect the rights of the defense when they took decisions which
came within the scope of Community law, even though the
Community legislation applicable did not expressly provide for such a
procedural requirement.51
Generally speaking, where the general principles of EU law
apply, which is the case where a claim based on EU law is enforced in
the national courts, it is hard to see why the fundamental rights of EU
law should not also apply. In the field of VAT, the Court had already
applied the general principles of EU law. In SFI, it had emphasized
that VAT was incontestably a matter governed by Community law.
The fact that, in the absence of Community rules, the Member States
were entitled to apply their own procedural rules, did not alter that
finding.52 In two judgments of 200553 and 2006,54 the ECJ had held
that, when collecting that tax, the Member States had to comply with
the principle of legitimate expectations. More specifically the right
not to be tried or punished twice, the ECJ had already, albeit
implicitly, found it to apply in agricultural law, where the question

50. Steffensen, Case C-276/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-3735, ¶¶ 63-71.
51. Sopropé v. Fazenda Pública, Case C-349/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-10369, ¶ 38; see
Hancox, supra note 31, at 1420.
52. Société Financière d’Investissments SPRL v. Belgian State, Case C-85/97, [1998]
E.C.R. I-7447, ¶ 31; see Rüdiger Stotz, Die Beachtung der Grundrechte bei der Durchführung
des Unionsrechts in den Mitgliedstaaten: von Stauder über Wachauf zu Åkerberg Fransson, in
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR MANFRED A. DAUSES ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 409, 425 (Daniela Heid et al.
eds., 2014).
53. Stichting ‘Goed Wonen’ v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, Case C-376/02, [2005]
E.C.R. I-3445.
54. Elmeka v. Ypourgos Oikonomikon, Joined Cases C-181/04 & C-183/04, [2006]
E.C.R. I-8167.
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arose whether national sanctions could be added to the sanctions
foreseen under EU law.55
It seems to follow rather clearly that, whenever Member States
give effect to rules of EU law through national procedural law or a
national regime of sanctions, they implement EU law for the purpose
of Article 51(1) of the Charter.56 To understand the concerns to which
Åkerberg Fransson gave rise, it thus appears necessary to take into
account the policy context in addition to the purely legal arguments.
C. Policy Arguments Regarding the Appropriate Scope of EU
Fundamental Rights Review
1. Practical Difficulties and Confusion
Some authors point to the dangers of adding another layer of
fundamental rights to the application of provisions of national law,
which already contain quite developed guarantees and which are
supplemented by the provisions of the ECHR. These authors fear a
lack of consistency.57
It must be considered, however, that the purpose of the
determination of the scope of the Charter is not simply to provide the
individual with yet another set of fundamental rights. Rather,
allowing the individual to invoke fundamental rights may lead to the
setting aside of the ordinary laws that would otherwise apply to that
individual. Where the ordinary laws that are meant to be enforced
against an individual are, at least partly, rules of EU law, it is also a
question of EU law whether those laws should be set aside on grounds

55. Criminal proceedings against Bonda, Case C-489/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:319. See
Jonathan Tomkin, Article 50, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 12,
at ¶¶ 50.29-50.32.
56. See DEB v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-279/09, [2010] E.C.R. I-13,849,
¶ 30. Ward, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 51.91-51.93; Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, The Place of the
Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS,
supra note 12, at ¶¶ 55.20-55.22.
57. See, e.g., Thomas von Danwitz & Katherina Paraschas, A Fresh Start for the
Charter: Fundamental Questions on the Application of the European Charter of Fundamental
Rights, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1396, 1417-18 (2011-2012); Jörn Griebel, Europäische
Grundrechte als Prüfungsmaßstab der Verfassungsbeschwerde, 129 DEUTSCHES
VERWALTUNGSBLATT 204, 211 (2013); Peter M. Huber, Auslegung und Anwendung der
Charta der Grundrechte, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2385, 2387 (2011).
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of EU fundamental rights.58 In the case of Åkerberg Fransson,
sanctions were requested to be imposed on the applicant, which were
meant to enforce fiscal obligations arising under EU law. The limits
posed to that enforcement by fundamental rights were therefore also a
question of EU law. Arguing, in that situation, that the applicant was
already protected by national fundamental rights (which, in fact, he
was not) would not do justice to the question at issue.
In addition, the content of related national or international
fundamental rights may not be exactly the same as that of the EU
fundamental right, and they cannot necessarily be invoked at the same
stage of the procedure.59 Drawing simultaneously on fundamental
rights from various sources is thus a task from which lawyers and
judges should not shy away.
2. Lack of Expertise
Unlike the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), the
ECJ is not a specialized human rights court.60 The ECtHR hardly ever
assesses fundamental rights in a comparative perspective.61 The lack
of depth of analysis may seem particularly disturbing where the
underlying issues are controversial and addressed differently in the
various Member States.62 It might be tempting to argue that those
issues should be allowed to mature in the national courts and not be
decided by the ECJ too early.63
At the same time, where a case is directed against the act of an
EU institution or concerns the impact of fundamental rights on the
58. See Filippo Fontanelli, Implementation of EU Law through domestic measures after
Fransson: the Court of Justice Buys Time and “Non-Preclusion” Troubles Loom Large, 39
EUR. L. REV. 682, 685 (2014).
59. In the same vein, some authors see advantages in the overlap between fundamental
rights from different sources. See, e.g., Sinead Douglas-Scott, A Tale of Two Courts:
Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis, 43 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 629, 664-65 (2006). Brun-Otto Bryde, points out that the multitude of sources of
fundamental rights in Europe has created very few problems in practice. See Brun-Otto Bryde,
The ECJ’s Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence – A Milestone in Transnational
Constitutionalism, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW, supra note 9, at 119, 127-28.
60. See, e.g., Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 56, at ¶ 55.05.
61. See De Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as
a Human Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. AND COMP. L. 168, 170-71 (2013).
62. Cartabia, supra note 21, at 26.
63. E.g., Samantha Besson, European Human Rights, Supranational Judicial Review and
Democracy. Thinking Outside the Judicial Box, in HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN AND THE NATIONAL
COURTS 97, 116-17 (Patricia Popelier et al. eds., 2011); Cartabia, supra note 21, at 26.
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interpretation of such an act, the ECJ will not be able to avoid the
issue, and it sometimes needs to take a courageous step.64 Even a
careful limitation of the scope of EU fundamental rights will therefore
not shield the ECJ from having to deal with potentially the most
difficult issues. Rather than trying to keep the ECJ out completely,
one should rely on that court being able to tread carefully regarding
the substance of those issues.
3. Legitimacy of Fundamental Rights Review
Given that it clearly follows form Article 51(1) of the Charter
that some acts of the Member States will in any event have to comply
with the fundamental rights of the Union, this is not the place to
repeat the general criticism of judicial review of fundamental rights
from the perspective of democratic legitimacy.65 For the more narrow
purpose of distinguishing between Member State acts that should or
should not be subject to EU fundamental rights review, democracy
might be considered to militate in favor of giving precedence, in each
situation, to “the legal norm stemming from the most inclusive
institution and decision-making process.”66
What should be considered the “most inclusive institution and
decision-making process” is, however, open to debate.67 In a situation
64. See, e.g., Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural
Resources and Seitlinger and Others, Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, [2014] E.C.R.
_____ (delivered Apr. 8, 2014) (not yet reported), in which the Court declared the Data
Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and
amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. L 105/54) invalid. See also Kadi and Al Barakaat
International Foundation v. Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P,
[2008] E.C.R. I-6351, in which the ECJ was later followed in substance by the ECtHR in Nada
v. Switzerland, No. 10593/08, judgment of Sept. 12, 2012. See Federico Fabbrini & Joris
Larik, The Accession of the EU to the ECHR and its Effects: Nada v. Switzerland, the Clash of
Legal Orders and the Constitutionalization of the ECtHR, 34 YEARBOOK OF EUR. L.
(forthcoming). Furthermore Google Spain and Google v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, Case C-131/12, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered
May 13, 2014) (not yet reported) on the contested “right to be forgotten” on the internet.
65. See, for that purpose, Besson, supra note 63, at 126-37.
66. Id. at 140. One may note that this argument appears to be linked to a sovereigntist
view of the state playing an essential role in the protection of fundamental rights. See Fabbrini,
supra note 6, at 15-19. It seems less relevant when one emphasizes the universal character of
fundamental rights. See id. at 20-24 (with further references); Editorial, After Åkerberg
Fransson and Melloni, 9 EUR. CONSTITUTIONAL L. REV. 169, 170 (2013).
67. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, The Bride of Messina: Constitutionalism and
Democracy in Europe, 30 EUR. L. REV. 775, 797 (2005) (with further references).
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in which an individual is affected by the application of EU as well as
Member State law which may not be his or her own Member State,
that individual may be in particular need of protection against the
externalities that the national law in question has created. Only the
EU level will then be—at least to some extent—“inclusive” of the
interests of that individual.68 Admittedly, much EU legislation
governs not only cross-border, but also internal situations.
Nevertheless, when Member States implement EU legislation, the
most inclusive level at which questions of fundamental rights should
be addressed would seem to be the level at which the basic rules were
adopted, thus the level of the EU. The argument concerning
democratic legitimacy thus ultimately serves to underscore the
importance of taking Article 51(1) of the Charter seriously, but not
more.
4. Respect for National Identities
Rights, even when worded the same way, do not necessarily
mean the same thing in different jurisdictions.69 Where national
fundamental rights are to be kept alive, this is also for the sake of
preserving those differences and the national identities of the Member
States, which were so dear to the heart of the GFCC in its decision on
the Anti-Terrorism Database Act. It is beyond the scope of the present
text to assess the way in which the EU in general is required to
respect national identities, in particular on the basis of Article 4(2)
TEU.70 For present purposes, it is proposed to accept that certain
fundamental rights may form part of national constitutional identities

68. See Alexander Somek, The Argument from Transnational Effects I: Representing
Outsiders through Freedom of Movement, 16 EUR. L.J. 315 (2010). The observation that EU
law creates a bias in favor of the mobile, thus may be correct in certain circumstances, but
such bias may be needed to counteract the bias, in national law, in favor of the “sedentary.”
See Komárek, supra note 17, at 426
69. In his book, Fabbrini provides various examples of differing standards of protection
between the Member States concerning fundamental rights. See Fabbrini, supra note 6; see
also Cartabia, supra note 21, at 28; Komárek, supra note 17, at 444; Friederike Lange,
Verschiebungen im europäischen Grundrechtssystem, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 169, 173 (2014).
70. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy & Stephan Schill, Overcoming Absolute Primacy:
Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1417
(2011).
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and that those fundamental rights are different from those protected at
EU level.71
That fact, however, does not seem to warrant a generally
restrictive approach to the scope of EU fundamental rights. A
restrictive approach would indeed be disproportionate if the goal was
simply to allow for the appropriate development of national
fundamental rights that form part of the national identity. That goal
can in fact equally be achieved, in many situations, by the
simultaneous application of EU and national fundamental rights.
Respect for national identities may require particular caution, though,
where a national fundamental right works in the opposite direction of
an EU fundamental right. In situations of that kind, the origin of the
right (EU or national) should not be the main reason to tip the balance
in favor of one or the other fundamental right. Rather, a balancing
exercise should be carried out that gives weight to all the rights and
interests at stake.72 Through such a balancing exercise, enough room
could be left for the development of national particularities in the
application of fundamental rights even when one admits that there is
an overlap.
5. Alienation of National Courts
Given the importance of the cooperation of national courts for
the enforcement of EU law, the ECJ itself must have a long term
interest in securing that cooperation. Strong signals from national
courts that they are not willing to go along with an expansive view of
the scope of EU fundamental rights are therefore not to be taken
lightly. There is, however, evidence to the effect that even the ECJ’s
most controversial holdings on rights have fared rather well over
time.73 Even if constitutional courts are at first reluctant, the ECJ may
be able to count on other allies in the national systems, and those

71. See, e.g., von Danwitz & Paraschas, supra note 57, at 1418-19. Another view,
however, points to the considerable convergence which already exists between European and
national fundamental rights. See Alan Rosas, The Applicability of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights at National Level, EUR. Y.B. OF HUM. RTS. 97, 100 (2013).
72. For a similar view, see Thym, supra note 12, at 403-04.
73. Alec Stone Sweet & Kathleen Stranz, Rights Adjudication and Constitutional
Pluralism in Germany and Europe, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 92, 100-04 (2012) (using the ECJ’s
decision in Mangold v. Helm, Case C-144/04, [2005] E.C.R. I-9981, and the follow-up to that
decision as an instructive case study).

2015]

EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

1115

allies might be in a stronger position than the constitutional courts.74
Furthermore, while the GFCC stands out as a particularly powerful
constitutional court, not all constitutional courts in Member States
would seem to have achieved the same standing internally. From the
perspective of the likelihood of its decisions being followed, it might
therefore seem overly cautious if the ECJ systematically aligned its
case law to the reactions of the GFCC. Indeed, in Melloni and
Åkerberg Fransson, the Spanish Constitutional Court75 and the
Swedish Courts respectively76 followed the substance of the ECJ's
decisions.
At the same time, greater alienation of national constitutional
courts ought to be avoided for broader reasons. Even though these
national constitutional courts may find it difficult to resist handing
power over to the ECJ when it comes to the protection of fundamental
rights, they may still try to retain the upper hand on other issues,
claiming a threat to the national constitutional identity or challenging
EU action as ultra vires. The first preliminary reference from the
GFCC77 may be evidence of that phenomenon. If the ECJ wants to
ensure that its rulings are followed across the board, it thus needs to
remain mindful of the general atmosphere of the dialogue which it
conducts with national courts.78
74. For a number of examples of internal controversies, see Lech Garlicki, Constitutional
Courts Versus Supreme Courts, 5 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 44 (2007).
75. S.T.C., Feb. 13, 2014 (B.J.C. No. 26/2014) (Spain).
76. Decision B 4946-12 of the Swedish Supreme Court (delivered June 11, 2013)
(departing from earlier case-law and considering that the tax penalties in question were
criminal in nature). On the overall development in Sweden, see Angelica Ericsson, The
Swedish Ne Bis in Idem Saga - Painting a Multi-Layered Picture, EUROPARÄTTSLIG
TIDSKRIFT 54 (2014).
77. Gauweiler and Others, Case C-62/14 (pending case). See, among the numerous
critical commentaries, Jürgen Bast, Don’t Act Beyond Your Powers: The Perils and Pitfalls of
the German Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires Review, 15 GER. L.J. 167 (2014); Werner
Heun, Eine verfassungswidrige Verfassungsgerichtsentscheidung – der Vorlagebeschluss des
BVerfG vom 14. 1. 2014, 69 JURISTENZEITUNG 331 (2014); Mattias Kumm, Rebel Without a
Good Cause: Karlsruhe’s Misguided Attempt to Draw the CJEU into a Game of “Chicken”
and What the CJEU Might Do About It, 15 GER. L.J. 203 (2014); Franz C. Mayer, Rebels
Without a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court’s OMT Reference,
15 GER. L.J. 111 (2014); Alexander Thiele, Friendly or Unfriendly Act? The “Historic”
Referral of the Constitutional Court to the ECJ Regarding the ECB’s OMT Program, 15 GER.
L.J. 241 (2014).
78. On the importance of that atmosphere, see, e.g., Peter Jacob Wattel, Köbler, CILFIT
and Welthgrove: We Can’t Go on Meeting Like This, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 177 (2004);
Boštjan Zalar, Basic Values, Judicial Dialogues and the Rule of Law in the Light of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Judges Playing by the Rules of the
Game, 14 ERA FORUM 319 (2013). See generally the various contributions in
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6. Reverse Solange
In EU legal discourse, “Solange”—in a narrow sense—stands
for the GFCC's reservations against the unlimited primacy of EU law
on grounds of fundamental rights.79 It denotes the concept that
fundamental rights review at the national level is not exercised as
long as the protection of fundamental rights is ensured at the EU
level. In recent years, the argument has repeatedly been made that the
ECJ should apply a “reverse Solange” formula in the sense that it
should step in and ensure the protection of fundamental rights where
that protection was deficient in a Member State.80 Notably, the legal
basis for the protection of fundamental rights at EU level in such
cases does not lie in the fact that the Member States are implementing
EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. The
jurisdiction of the ECJ would rather have to find a broader and more
horizontal basis.
Given that the ECJ in Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson ruled on
more narrow issues of interpretation of Articles 53 and 51(1) of the
Charter, describing that case law as the adoption of “reverse Solange”
by the ECJ81 would therefore not convey a complete picture.
However, were the ECJ ever willing to endorse a broader “reverse
Solange” formula, a rather broad understanding of the “ordinary”
scope of EU fundamental rights would seem to be a more coherent
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS IN EUROPE, supra note 17. On some of the more subtle
forms of pursuing dialogue with the national courts, see Giuseppe Martinico, Judging in the
Multilevel Legal Order: Exploring the Techniques of ‘Hidden Dialogue’, 21 KING’S L.J. 257
(2010); Daniel Sarmiento, The Silent Lamb and the Deaf Wolves: Constitutional Pluralism,
Preliminary References and the Role of Silent Judgments in EU Law, in CONSTITUTIONAL
PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 285 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komárek eds.,
2012).
79. Daniel Halberstam, Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the
European Union and the United States, in RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 326, 351 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P.
Trachtman eds., 2009); Erich Vranes, German Constitutional Foundations of, and Limitations
to, EU Integration: A Systematic Analysis, 14 GER. L.J. 75 (2013).
80. Halberstam, supra note 79, at 352-53; Halberstam, Pluralism in “Marbury” and
“Van Gend”, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW, supra note 9, at 26, 34-35; Armin von
Bogdandy, Carlino Antpöhler, Johanna Dickschen, Simon Hentrei, Maja Smrkolj & Matthias
Kottmann, Reverse Solange - Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights against EU
Member States, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 489 (2012); see also Opinion of Advocate General
Poiares Maduro in Centro Europa 7 v. Ministero delle Comunicazioni e Autorità per le
garanzie nelle comunicazioni and Direzione generale per le concessioni e le autorizzazioni del
Ministero delle Comunicazioni, Case C-380/05, [2008] E.C.R. I-349, ¶¶ 20-22.
81. See, e.g., Sarmiento, supra note 12, at 1295.
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way to prepare the ground than a narrow reading. It should therefore
not be excluded that the ECJ intended, already at this point, to send a
signal to certain Member States that EU fundamental rights will act as
a backstop in many situations.82
On the other hand, from the perspective of a Member State
which considers itself to be at the forefront of protection of
fundamental rights, a reference to the ECJ's approach in Melloni and
Åkerberg Fransson as the introduction of some kind of “reverse
Solange” might be considered as a sign of mistrust.83
7. Relationship Between EU Law and the ECHR
The ECJ held in Åkerberg Fransson that EU law does not
govern the relations between the ECHR and the legal systems of the
Member States, nor does the ECJ determine the conclusions to be
drawn by a national court in the event of conflict between the rights
guaranteed by that convention and a rule of national law.84
In its Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the ECHR, the
ECJ emphasized, conversely, that it should not be possible for the
ECtHR to call into question the ECJ’s findings in relation to the scope
ratione materiae of EU law, for the purposes, in particular, of
determining whether a Member State is bound by fundamental rights
of the EU.85 The ECJ recalled that it had interpreted Article 53 of the
Charter as meaning that the application of national standards of
protection of fundamental rights must not compromise the level of
protection provided for by the Charter or the primacy, unity, and
effectiveness of EU law.86
It concluded from that position that, in so far as Article 53 of the
ECHR essentially reserves the power of the Contracting Parties to lay
82. See CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AREA: THEORY,
LAW AND POLITICS IN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA (Armin von Bogdandy & Pal Sonnevend
eds., 2015). Some recent constitutional amendments in Hungary, concerning the compulsory
early retirement of judges (Commission v. Hungary, Case C-286/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687)
and the independence of the data protection authority (Commission v. Hungary, Case
C-288/12, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Apr. 8, 2014) (not yet reported), have reached the
ECJ and led to a declaration of infringement.
83. See, e.g., Rupert Scholz, Nationale und europäische Grundrechte: Umgekehrte
“Solange-Regel”?, 129 DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 197, 201 (2014).
84. Åkerberg Fransson, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Feb. 26, 2013), ¶ 44; see
Giuseppe Martinico, Two Worlds (Still) Apart? ECHR and EU Law before National Judges, in
THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR 141 (Vasiliki Kosta et al. eds., 2014).
85. Opinion 2/13, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Dec. 18, 2014), ¶ 186.
86. Id. ¶ 188, referring to Melloni, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Feb. 26, 2013), ¶ 60.
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down higher standards of protection of fundamental rights than those
guaranteed by the ECHR, that provision should be coordinated with
Article 53 of the Charter, as interpreted by the ECJ, so that the power
granted to Member States by Article 53 of the ECHR is limited—with
respect to the rights recognized by the Charter that correspond to
those guaranteed by the ECHR—to that which is necessary to ensure
that the level of protection provided for by the Charter and the
primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law are not compromised.
The ECJ thus took the view that the fact that no provision in the draft
accession agreement envisaged to ensure such coordination was one
of the elements that rendered that agreement incompatible with the
Treaties.87
In hindsight, one might therefore say that the ECJ's
interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter in Melloni paved the way
for its insistence on the above mentioned coordination mechanism.
That such a mechanism would indeed be required in the accession
instruments to preserve the autonomy of the EU legal order seems,
however, highly questionable.88 It is not the task of the ECtHR to rule
on the extent of the power of the Contracting Parties to lay down
higher standards of protection. Whether their power is limited under
EU law is a purely internal question of EU law and it can therefore
appropriately be addressed by the ECJ in a preliminary reference89 or,
as the case may be, infringement procedure.
D. The ECJ’s Answer to Those Policy Arguments
1. Åkerberg Fransson
As if it had anticipated some of the objections set out in the
previous section, the ECJ has, in Åkerberg Fransson, managed the
relationship between EU fundamental rights and national fundamental
rights in a way which, at least on its face, allows national courts a
certain amount of breathing space.90

87. Id. ¶¶ 189-190.
88. See also Editorial Comments, The EU's Accession to the ECHR – A “NO” from the
ECJ!, 52 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1, 11 (2015). For a more sympathetic view on this aspect,
see Jean-Paul Jacqué, Non à l’adhésion à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme?,
http://www.droit-union-europeenne.be/412337458 (last visited March 1, 2015).
89. As it was, regarding the interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter, in Melloni.
90. Thym, supra note 12, at 404.
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The ECJ explained that, since EU law did not fully determine the
scope of Member State action, national fundamental rights could in
principle be applied in addition to EU fundamental rights.91 It may be
noted that the choice of Åkerberg Fransson as a case in which to
make this statement was rather shrewd, for at least five reasons. First,
in some respect, namely on the meaning of idem, the ECJ's case law
on ne bis in idem had influenced the ECtHR.92 Second, differently
from ne bis in idem in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, ne bis
in idem under Article 50 of the Charter applies not only within a
single Member State, but also between Member States.93 Third,
Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR has not yet been ratified by Germany and
the Netherlands, while a number of Member States have issued
declarations according to which the meaning of criminal offenses is to
be understood as limited to criminal offenses so qualified under
national law.94 Fourth, the draft agreement on the accession of the EU
to the ECHR does not foresee an accession to Protocol No. 7.95 Fifth,
the ECJ was certainly aware that there was no more protective right of
ne bis in idem to be found in the Swedish legal order. Ne bis in idem
thus seemed to be an excellent case in which to affirm the autonomy
of the EU legal order and the added value of EU fundamental rights.96
That affirmation of autonomy was toned down, however, by an
apparently rather light touch in the ECJ's substantive assessment: after
having recalled that Article 50 of the Charter precluded criminal
proceedings in respect of the same acts from being brought against
the same person only if a previously imposed tax penalty was
criminal in nature and had become final and mentioned the three
criteria relevant for the purpose of assessing whether tax penalties are
91. Åkerberg Fransson, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Feb. 26, 2013), ¶ 29.
92. ECtHR, Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, No. 14,939/03, [2009] (explicitly referring to
the case law of the ECJ); see Hancox, supra note 31, at 1414; Lenaerts, supra note 42, at 396;
Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 56, at ¶ 55.62.
93. See John Vervaele, The Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR)
and its Ne bis in idem Principle in the Member States of the EU, 6 REV. OF EUR. ADMIN. L.
113, 133 (2013); see also Antoine Bailleux, Entre droits fondamentaux et intégration
européenne, la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne face à son destin, in
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 215, 227 (2014).
94. See Hancox, supra note 31, at 1414; Vervaele, supra note 93, at 115 ; see also
Bailleux, supra note 93, at 227-28.
95. Hancox, supra note 31, at 1429-30.
96. For the reference to that autonomy, see Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 56, at
¶ 55.64, even though the authors generally refer to Article 50 of the Charter as an example of
convergence.
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criminal in nature,97 the ECJ tasked the referring court to determine,
in the light of those criteria, whether the combining of tax penalties
and criminal penalties that was provided for by national law should be
examined in relation to national standards of protection, which could
lead it to regard their combination as contrary to those standards, as
long as the remaining penalties were effective, proportionate, and
dissuasive.98
The ECJ then answered the question by stating that the ne bis in
idem principle laid down in Article 50 of the Charter did not preclude
a Member State from imposing successively, for the same acts of noncompliance with declaration obligations in the field of VAT, a tax
penalty, and a criminal penalty in so far as the first penalty was not
criminal in nature, a matter which was for the national court to
determine.99
It is worth noting, firstly, that the ECJ limited itself to listing, in
the briefest possible form, the elements of interpretation of Article 50
of the Charter. Secondly, the ECJ emphasized, even in its answer to
the question, the role incumbent upon the national judge when
applying those elements to the case at hand. Thirdly, the ECJ
expressly gave an opportunity to the national judge to apply a
potentially more generous national rule of ne bis in idem. These
elements appear to indicate the ECJ's willingness to respect the role of
national fundamental rights even at the expense of—some—
effectiveness of EU law. It is true that the ECJ pointed out that the
penalties remaining after the potential application of a national
fundamental right still needed to be effective, proportionate, and
dissuasive. Assuming, quod non, that the national court reached the
conclusion that the first penalty was not criminal in nature and that
Article 50 of the Charter did not preclude the application of a criminal
penalty, but that it then found a more generous national fundamental
right which precluded even the combination of administrative and
criminal penalties, the application of that national fundamental right
would have been subject to an assessment whether the administrative
penalty alone was effective. There was thus clearly not a blank check
to apply the national fundamental right.100
97. Åkerberg Fransson, [2013] E.C.R. I-_____ (delivered Feb. 26, 2013), ¶¶ 33-35.
98. Id. ¶ 36.
99. Id. ¶ 37.
100. As a consequence, Bailleux doubts that the national court could apply a potential
national fundamental right at all. See Bailleux, supra note 93, at 231.
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It is submitted, though, that the limits to the application of
national fundamental rights are a mere consequence of the—correct—
finding that the case was within the scope of EU law: there was a duty
under EU law to apply effective, proportionate, and dissuasive
sanctions to violations of VAT law. EU fundamental rights confined
that duty. This duty could also be confined by national fundamental
rights, but this could not lead to a disregard for the primacy of EU
law.101 It is difficult to see how the ECJ could have gone any further
than that.
The ECJ’s vision for the future of EU fundamental rights is thus
one of coexistence with national fundamental rights rather than one of
exclusive spheres.102 Coexistence is possible whenever the primacy,
unity, and effectiveness of EU law do not require the application of
EU fundamental rights only.103 The idea of exclusive application of
either EU or national fundamental rights in separate spheres had been
championed in particular by the GFCC,104 but the ECJ has,
unsurprisingly, rejected it.105
2. In Subsequent Case Law
The ECJ has in the meantime shown itself mindful of the need
not to create too much overlap between the scopes of EU and national
fundamental rights. Siragusa v. Regione Sicilia106 concerned a
requirement under national law to demolish unauthorized building
works in a landscape conservation area. The ECJ referred to Åkerberg
Fransson as containing relevant principles, but then went on to set out
in detail the elements that may point to a case coming within the
scope of Union law. The ECJ stressed that the concept of
“implementing EU law” requires a certain degree of connection above

101. Cf. Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 56, ¶ 55.85.
102. On the two positions, see Kingreen, supra note 43, at 802-04; Thym, supra note 12,
at 401-09; see also Daniel Thym, Vereinigt die Grundrechte, 70 JURISTENZEITUNG 53 (2015)
(in favor of coexistence).
103. See Ladenburger, supra note 12, 173-76; Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 56,
¶ 55.76.
104. See Thym, supra note 12, at 404-07.
105. Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 56, ¶ 55.86.
106. Siragusa v. Regione Sicilia, Case C-206/13, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Mar.
6, 2014) (not yet reported).
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and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those
matters having an indirect impact on the other.107
In order to determine whether national legislation involves the
implementation of EU law for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the
Charter, the ECJ declared that it would rely on a whole series of
points, some of which are whether that legislation is intended to
implement a provision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and
whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law,
even if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether
there are specific rules of EU law on the matter or capable of
affecting it.108
The ECJ further pointed out that the reason for pursuing the
objective of protecting fundamental rights in EU law was the need to
avoid a situation in which the level of protection of fundamental
rights varied according to the national law involved in such a way as
to undermine the unity, primacy, and effectiveness of EU law.109 That
last part of the reasoning, which is reminiscent of the origins of the
protection of fundamental rights in EU law, underscores the point
that, where the application of EU fundamental rights is triggered, the
primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law will normally not allow
for the concomitant full application of national fundamental rights.
It is worth noting, on the one hand, that the ECJ spelled out these
elements in a decision of a chamber of three judges, thereby clearly
signaling that it was not deviating from Åkerberg Fransson, but
merely drawing the almost self-evident conclusions from that
judgment. On the other hand, the Court in Siragusa referred to
practically all the leading cases in which, prior to the entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty, it had found that the situation before the
national judge did not come within the scope of EU law.110 The test it
applied had been formulated in Iida,111 one of the citizenship cases
107. Siragusa, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Mar. 6, 2014), ¶ 24. At that paragraph,
the ECJ refers to Kremzow v. Republik Österreich, Case C-299/95, [1997] E.C.R. I-2629,
¶ 16. The language used is, however, quite close to that of the GFCC in the Anti-Terrorism
Database Act, Case 1 BvR 1215/07, delivered Apr. 24, 2013, BVerfGE 133, 277, ¶ 91.
108. Siragusa, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Mar. 6, 2014), ¶ 25.
109. Id. ¶ 32 (referring to Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, ¶ 3,
and Melloni, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Feb. 26, 2013), ¶ 60).
110. Kremzow, [1997] E.C.R. I-2629, ¶ 16; Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comune di
Guidonia and Presidente Regione Lazio, Case C-309/96, [1997] E.C.R. I-7493, ¶¶ 21-23;
Criminal proceedings against Maurin, Case C-144/95, [1996] E.C.R. I-2909, ¶¶ 11-12.
111. Iida, ECLI:EU:C:2012:691.
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that might have seemed to be overruled by Åkerberg Fransson.112 The
intention certainly was to assuage concerns over too broad a scope of
EU fundamental rights.
The same intention is visible in Julian Hernández,113 where the
ECJ, perhaps more surprisingly, ruled that a claim of an employee
against the State for remuneration not paid by the employer in a
situation in which the employee was subrogated to a right to the
payment of remuneration which has become due during proceedings
challenging a dismissal after the sixtieth working day following the
date on which the action was brought granted in favor of the employer
who was insolvent, did not come within the scope of Directive
2008/94/EC114 and thus neither within the scope of EU fundamental
rights.
Having announced the basic principles in Åkerberg Fransson
and Melloni, the ECJ thus reverted to a case-by-case assessment of
the scope of EU fundamental rights.115 The line of reasoning followed
in that case-by-case assessment would seem to converge with the
position expressed by the GFCC. EU fundamental rights apply where
Member State action is at least partly determined by EU law. That
leaves room for saying that Member State action is not determined by
EU law on the facts of a given case. The more one is prepared to
focus on the facts of the case, the easier it becomes to say that the
decisive element of the case is ultimately not determined by EU law.
Åkerberg Fransson may thus be reconciled with the long list of cases
which the ECJ did not consider to come within the scope of EU
112. Sarmiento, supra note 12, at 1276. Other citizenship cases decided after Åkerberg
Fransson confirmed that there was no change of line for those cases. Ymeraga and Others v.
Ministre du Travail, de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration, Case C-87/12, [2013] E.C.R. I_____
(delivered May 8, 2013) (not yet reported); Alokpa and Others v. Ministre du Travail, de
l'Emploi et de l'Immigration, Case C-86/12, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Oct. 10, 2013)
(not yet reported); O v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor
Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v. B, Case C-456/12, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Mar. 12,
2014) (not yet reported).
113. Julian Hernández and Others v. Reino de España, Case C-198/13, [2014] E.C.R.
I_____ (delivered July 10, 2014) (not yet reported).
114. Directive 2008/94/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, 2008 O.J. L 283/36.
115. For other examples and a critical evaluation of the subsequent case law, see Filippo
Fontanelli, supra note 58, at 682; Daniel Thym, Blaupausenfallen bei der Abgrenzung von
Grundgesetz und Grundrechtecharta, 67 DIE ÖFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 941 (2014). The
ECJ has in particular confirmed the application of EU fundamental rights derogating from
fundamental freedoms of the internal market. See Proceedings brought by Pfleger and Others,
Case C-390/12, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Apr. 30, 2014) (not yet reported).
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law.116 Given that factual determinations are in any event to be made
by the national courts, those courts are therefore given some leeway
for finding that EU fundamental rights do not apply without even
making a preliminary reference to the ECJ.
In the light of the ECJ’s willingness to respect the role both of
national fundamental rights and of national courts, fears that the
protection of national fundamental rights might be reduced to a
marginal role seem exaggerated. Indeed, it is hard to find a single case
decided by the ECJ since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in
which it held without good reason that the Union fundamental rights
applied to the Member States.117 For the reasons set out above,
Åkerberg Fransson is at any rate not such a case.
IV. HOW TO MANAGE THE COEXISTENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FROM VARIOUS SOURCES
The role the ECJ should play from a substantive and a
procedural point of view for the protection of fundamental rights in
Europe raises important questions, which are quite closely linked. In
fact, the more the ECJ determines the content of an EU fundamental
right, the less room it will leave for the simultaneous application of
coexisting national fundamental rights. By managing the relationship
between EU and national fundamental rights, the ECJ is therefore at
the same time managing the relationship between the various courts
that are supposed to uphold those rights. A number of tools seem to
be available to the ECJ. At the present stage, those tools that allow for
flexible, reversible solutions should be preferred over rigid,
permanent ones.

116. For the references given by von Danwitz, see Thomas von Danwitz, The Rule of
Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ, 37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1311, 1339 n. 94 (2014).
117. If anything, it would rather seem that the Court erred on the side of caution. For an
important recent example, see Dano and Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, Case C-333/13, [2014]
E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Nov. 11, 2014) (not yet reported), ¶¶ 88-90, in which the Court—in
the certainly highly delicate context of what has come to be termed “welfare tourism” by the
media—limited itself to explaining very briefly that, since the conditions creating the right to
the social benefits at issue did not result from secondary EU legislation and the Member States
thus had competence to determine the conditions for the grant of those benefits, they were not
implementing EU law when they were exercising that competence.
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A. Substantive Deference
Depending on the extent to which a situation is determined by
EU law, the ECJ might go into more or less depth regarding the
analysis of fundamental rights.118 In Åkerberg Fransson, the Court, as
discussed above, indeed appears to have taken a quite deferential
approach.
Such deference seems appropriate whenever a case is not
entirely determined by EU law. It must be kept in mind that, quite
often, more than one fundamental right may come into play and it
may become necessary to balance those different fundamental
rights.119 A fundamental right protected at the EU level might then
compete with another fundamental right protected either also at the
EU or only at the national level. If the ECJ went into great detail
elaborating the contours of one of the fundamental rights at stake, the
primacy of EU law might lead to that fundamental right prevailing
even though a thorough balancing at the national level might have
produced a different outcome.120 A light touch review by the ECJ
would allow the result of the national balancing test to prevail121 and
at the same time avoid the impression that the effectiveness of EU law
is undermined.
The ECJ could, for that purpose, take its cue from the ECtHR
and the lesson that court has drawn from its, partly indirect,
interaction with the GFCC in the Princess of Hannover122 and
Görgülü123 cases, which resulted in the ECtHR acknowledging a large
118. Accord Besson, supra note 63, at 115; Thym, supra note 12, at 403-07; see also
Torres Pérez, supra note 6, at 168-77; Torres Pérez, supra note 7, at 129; Torres Pérez, supra
note 17, at 65-66.
119. Lange, supra note 69, at 173; Thym, supra note 12, at 407; Torres Pérez, supra note
7, at 127.
120. This would seem to be the outcome envisaged by Sarmiento. See Sarmiento, supra
note 12, at 1296.
121. Accord Sarmiento, supra note 12, at 1294.
122. Von Hannover v. Germany, No. 59,320/00, judgment of June 24, 2004, ECHR
2004-VI; GFCC, Case 1 BvR 1602/07, judgment of Feb. 26, 2008; see Corinna Coors,
Headwind from Europe: The New Position of the German Courts on Personality Rights after
the Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 11 GER. L.J. 527 (2010); Von
Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), No. 40,660/08 & 60,641/08, judgment of Feb. 7, 2012; Rainer
Grote, The ECHR’s Rulings in von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2) and Axel Springer AG v.
Germany: Rebalancing Freedom of the Press with the Respect of Privacy, 55 GER. Y.B. INT’L
L. 639 (2013). Bailleux, supra note 93, at 226.
123. GFCC, Case 2 BvR 1481/04, judgment of October 14, 2004, BVerfGE 111, 307.
See Lech Garlicki, Cooperation of Courts: The Role of Supranational Jurisdictions in Europe,
6 INT’L J. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 509, 518-21 (2008); Christoph Grabenwarter, Das
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margin of appreciation of the Member States when balancing
different fundamental rights and limiting itself to a control over
whether a proper balancing test had been carried out.
At the same time, one needs to bear in mind that the procedural
position of the ECJ is rather different from that of the ECtHR: the
latter court will only pronounce itself in a case which has already
been finally decided at national level, and in full knowledge of the
decisions of the national courts, including, where appropriate, the
constitutional court. The ECJ, by contrast, may be called to step in at
any stage of the national proceedings, even before any national court
has taken a position on the interpretation of fundamental rights in the
case at hand.124 The ECJ could thus not exercise deference in exactly
the same way as the ECtHR.
Because it is not the task of the ECJ to rule on the national
dispute, however, it might appropriately limit its reply to pointing to
the relevant elements of interpretation of the EU fundamental rights
that come into play, while leaving the final balancing to the referring
court.125 One might object to that approach that it will not meet the
needs of the referring court, which wanted to get an answer to its
question and will now have to decide the case itself.126 Its benefit
would, however, remain that national courts might feel more
encouraged to refer to national constitutional courts as far as national
fundamental rights are concerned.
mehrpolige
Grundrechtsverhältnis
im
Spannungsfeld
zwischen
europäischem
ALS
Menschenrechtsschutz
und
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit,
in
VÖLKERRECHT
WERTORDNUNG/COMMON VALUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT 193 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2006); Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff,
ECtHR and National Jurisdiction – The Görgülü Case, HUMBOLDT FORUM RECHT 138
(2006); Stone Sweet, supra note 18, at 71; Christian Tomuschat, The Effects of the Judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights According to the German Constitutional Court, 11
GER. L.J. 513 (2010).
124. See Wim Voermans, Protection of European Human Rights by Highest Courts in
Europe: the Art of Triangulation, in HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN LEGAL
ORDER: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN AND THE NATIONAL COURTS 365
(Patricia Popelier et al. eds., 2011).
125. Thym also points to the ECJ’s decision in F v. Premier ministre, Case C-168/13
PPU, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered May 30, 2013) (not yet reported), as a good example of
deference. Thym, supra note 12, at 403-04; see also DEB, [2010] E.C.R. I-13849. The ECJ has
already deferred to balancing by the referring court in earlier cases, notably in Promusicae v.
Telefónica de España, Case C-275/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-271, ¶ 68. But see Bruno de Witte, The
Use of the ECHR and Convention Case Law by the European Court of Justice, in HUMAN
RIGHTS PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER, supra note 124, at 17, 28 (criticizing
deference).
126. Bailleux, supra note 93, at 225-26; Komárek, supra note 17, at 431.
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Substantive deference should not, by contrast, go as far as giving
only a minimum content to EU fundamental rights.127 This would
certainly not be in line with the intentions behind the drawing up of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
B. Better Reasoning of Judgments
If the ECJ has to engage in an interpretation of fundamental
rights more frequently, a recurring suggestion is that it ought to
reason its judgments more thoroughly, drawing, in particular, on a
comparative method.128 It should be noted that the suggestions of
more deference and better reasoning appear to point in different
directions. If one wants the ECJ to engage in a thorough debate on the
meaning of a particular fundamental right, taking into account the
relevant comparable provisions of national and international law, one
should expect the outcome of that debate to be the solution to the
relevant issue, with preference being given to one particular
interpretation. That approach seems called for only in situations in
which there is no room left for the simultaneous application of EU
and national fundamental rights, for instance where the validity of
secondary EU law is at stake. In those situations, it would also seem
to be the role of the European Commission, when making its
submissions to the ECJ, to provide the ECJ with all the necessary
comparative elements.
Even though more thoroughly reasoned judgments may enjoy
greater legitimacy, and even though the ECJ is in principle equipped
to do comparative studies, one should remain mindful of what can
realistically be achieved with the available means. The number of
cases brought before the ECJ has risen from 560 in 2009 to almost
700 in 2013, out of which 450 were preliminary references from
national courts, compared with around 300 preliminary references in

127. The efforts of Advocate General Cruz Villalón seem to go in the direction of giving
a minimum content to ne bis in idem in view of the different situations in the Member States.
See Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Åklagaren v. Åkerberg Fransson, Case
C-617/10, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered June 6, 2012), ¶¶ 83-86; see also Tomkin, supra
note 55, at ¶¶ 50.81-50.86 (providing a critical assessment).
128. Cartabia, supra note 21, at 30; De Búrca, supra note 61, at 176-82; Torres Pérez,
supra note 17, at 65; see also de Witte, supra note 42, at ¶ 53.33, and von Danwitz, supra note
116, at 1317-21.
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2009.129 Under this current situation, a very strong rationale would be
needed to convince the ECJ to issue longer judgments.
C. Stricter Scrutiny of the Admissibility of Preliminary References on
Fundamental Rights
Mindful of the systems of procedural law and court jurisdiction
in the Member States, the ECJ might want to consider, in the medium
term, tightening the conditions of admissibility of references that try
to push it to making broad statements on the application of EU
fundamental rights to particular national measures. Given that it may
take national courts quite some time and effort to refer questions
concerning the protection of national fundamental rights to national
constitutional courts,130 one may also expect them to provide the ECJ
with all the material needed to give an informed answer. The ECJ
should not allow itself to be manipulated,131 and it is indeed not likely
to do so. Since the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force, the ECJ has in
numerous cases refused to reply to questions related to fundamental
rights or general principles of EU law for the reason that the main
case did not come within the scope of EU law.132 In a number of
cases, the ECJ has done so, inter alia, on the grounds that the
referring court had not explained why the case pending before it was
within the scope of EU law.133 A more searching inquiry into the
admissibility of preliminary references should, however, only be
practiced with great circumspection. Indeed, a parallel procedure for
129.
For statistics, see ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2013, ECJ, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-06/qdag14001enc.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
130. For the case of concrete judicial review in Germany with further references, see
DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 13 (3d ed. 2012); see also Lange, supra note 69, at 173.
131. To borrow Karen Alter’s image of national courts as children deciding whether to
ask Mom or Dad certain questions, with Mom being the national constitutional court and Dad
being the ECJ, one may imagine Dad getting many more questions if he is much more
prepared to answer them than Mom. If this becomes too much for him, Dad might ultimately
decide to follow Mom’s strategy. See Alter, supra note 21, at 466-67.
132. See von Danwitz, supra note 116, at 1339 n. 94.
133. See, e.g., Proceedings brought by Zakaria, Case C-23/12, [2013] E.C.R. I_____
(delivered Jan. 17, 2013) (not yet reported); Sky Italia v. Autorità per le Garanzie nelle
Comunicazioni, Case C-234/12, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered July 18, 2013) (not yet
reported), ¶¶ 28-32; Sociedade Agrícola e Imobiliária da Quinta de S. Paio v. Instituto da
Segurança Social, Case C-258/13, [2013] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Nov. 28, 2013) (not yet
reported), ¶ 21; Široká v. Úrad verejného zdravotníctva Slovenskej republiky, Case C-459/13,
[2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered July 17, 2014) (not yet reported), ¶¶ 23-25.
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referring questions on national fundamental rights to a national
constitutional court does not exist in all Member States. As a
consequence, the risk that a very low threshold to the admissibility of
references to the ECJ would lead to a more frequent bypassing of
national constitutional courts does not arise in all Member States.
Furthermore, national courts should not be discouraged in principle
from referring questions on the interpretation of EU fundamental
rights to the ECJ.
D. Procedural Deference to National Systems of Protection of
Fundamental Rights
A recurring request is that the ECJ reconsider its approach to
national provisions, foreseeing that priority be given to the review of
compliance with national constitutional law, including fundamental
rights. The ECJ should, it is said, recognize the special role of
national constitutional courts instead of antagonizing and
marginalizing them.134 So far, the ECJ has taken the view that
national provisions must not stand in the way of the interaction
between all national courts and the ECJ in the preliminary reference
procedure.135 It softened its stance ever so slightly in Melki and
Abdeli,136 in which the ECJ in essence allowed “prior” review of
constitutionality at the national level to be carried out subject to the
preservation of the full right of ordinary courts to make preliminary
references at any time. Ordinary courts were further empowered to
grant interim relief and to set aside national provisions that they
considered to be contrary to EU law even after the review of
constitutionality had been concluded.
Going further than that would mean allowing national
constitutional courts to have a first say either on the interpretation of
national fundamental rights (a different question from the one
potentially to be submitted to the ECJ) or on the interpretation of EU
fundamental rights (the same question). In the first scenario, the
procedure before the national constitutional court could have several
outcomes: it could uphold the claim based on fundamental rights, in
which case there would indeed be no reason to continue the
134. Bobek, supra note 17, at 307-08; Cartabia, supra note 21, at 29; Komárek, supra
note 17, at 431-32; Torres Pérez, supra note 17, at 64-65.
135. Simmenthal, [1978] E.C.R. 629.
136. Melki and Abdeli, Joined Cases C-188/10 & C-189/10, [2010] E.C.R. I-5667.
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proceedings and look at EU fundamental rights.137 It could also, and
this is probably the more frequent scenario, dismiss the claim, in
which case EU fundamental rights would remain as the last recourse.
However, whether EU fundamental rights get examined at all in that
situation is then in the hands of the ordinary court. That court might
take the view that it is not worth going through the trouble of looking
for potential nuances that might allow the EU law claim to succeed
and it might equally be discouraged from making yet another timeconsuming reference in the same case. If, on the other hand, it does
make that reference, the eventual success of the claim based on EU
fundamental rights might highlight a divergence of interpretation
which national constitutional courts apparently so much dread.
Furthermore, it needs to be recalled that EU fundamental rights
never apply in isolation, but always in conjunction with other rules of
EU law. As the ECJ has underlined, the objective of protecting
fundamental rights in EU law is the need to avoid a situation in which
the level of protection of fundamental rights varies according to the
national law involved in such a way as to undermine the unity,
primacy, and effectiveness of EU law.138 Where the facts of a case are
within the scope of EU law, the application of a national fundamental
right is thus conditioned upon respecting the unity, primacy, and
effectiveness of EU law and will often require an interpretation of
rules of EU law other than fundamental rights. It would thus seem
more expedient—and also more prudent—to clarify the reach of EU
law and EU fundamental rights before turning to the application of
national fundamental rights.
In the second scenario, in which a national constitutional court
considers itself competent to rule on the interpretation of EU
fundamental rights,139 there seems to be even less reason to give
priority to that assessment before addressing the ECJ: the national
constitutional court has in that case acknowledged itself that EU law
is relevant to the outcome of the case. Article 267 TFEU thus gives
137. The national constitutional court may, however, when upholding the claim, have
disregarded the unity, primacy, and effectiveness of EU law.
138. Siragusa, [2014] E.C.R. I_____, ¶ 32.
139. This is what the Austrian Constitutional Court did in a much-commented decision
of March 14, 2012, Cases U 466/11 and U 1836/11. For an overview in English, see Reinhard
Klaushofer & Rainer Palmstorfer, Austrian Constitutional Court Uses Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union as Standard of Review: Effects on Union Law, 19 EURO. PUB. L.
1 (2013); Konrad Lachmayer, The Austrian Approach towards European Human Rights, 7
VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 105 (2013); see also Komárek, supra note 17, at 421-22, 444.
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any national court the possibility and imposes on national courts of
last instance a duty to refer to the ECJ any relevant question on the
interpretation of the EU fundamental right at stake. The national
constitutional court seized with the question of EU fundamental rights
could, it is true, make a preliminary reference itself. While that would
appear to be the best scenario, the hesitation with which many
national constitutional courts have so far referred questions to the
ECJ140 would not seem to make these courts the ideal filter for the
application of EU fundamental rights. If the national constitutional
court does not make a reference, but upholds or dismisses the claim,
in the latter case possibly on the basis of an interpretation of Article
51(1) of the Charter which leads it to conclude that EU fundamental
rights do not apply, the case reverts to the ordinary court, which may
evidently take a different view. If the case subsequently reaches the
ECJ, possible divergences of interpretation will emerge with full
force.
Why would a national constitutional court then insist on giving
an interpretation of EU fundamental rights that will, on grounds of
EU law, not be finally binding on the ordinary courts? The hope
would seem to be that the ECJ would gain so much trust in the
interpretation of EU fundamental rights by the national constitutional
courts that the ECJ would hardly ever have to disagree. To justify
their attitude, national constitutional courts might be tempted to point
to the prior involvement procedure on which the ECJ has insisted in
the context of the accession of the EU to the ECHR.141 That
comparison, however, would be unconvincing. While the system of
protection set up by the ECHR is indeed based on the subsidiarity of
review by the ECtHR with regard to review at internal level, there is
no such subsidiarity regarding the protection of rights following from
EU law. Given that the application of fundamental rights and other
rules of EU law is always interwoven, it would not seem appropriate
to introduce subsidiarity of the application of some rules of EU law
which clearly enjoy the highest rank in the EU legal order, namely
fundamental rights.

140. See generally BOBEK, supra note 17.
141. For a thorough discussion of that mechanism, see Tobias Lock, End of an Epic?
The Draft Agreement on the EU's Accession to the ECHR, 31 Y.B. EUR. L. 162 (2012); see
also Aida Torres Pérez, Too Many Voices? The Prior Involvement of the Court of Justice of
the European Union, EUR. J. HUM. RTS. 565 (2013) (providing critical analysis).
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There are a number of other reasons for which a privileged
position of national constitutional courts compared with ordinary
courts does not appear desirable. In fact, still today, the great majority
of preliminary references come from national courts of lower instance
and hardly any come from the national constitutional courts.142
Limiting the free access of all national courts to the ECJ risks
seriously reducing the possibility of any issues of EU law being
brought up by national courts, not just issues of fundamental rights.
Furthermore, at least some constitutional courts might be more
politicized and more deferential to the position of a national
government.143 In addition, the enforcement of EU law in the Member
States would necessarily become less uniform. In those Member
States with mechanisms under national law obliging ordinary courts
to seek access to the national constitutional court first, the
enforcement of EU law would become contingent upon the use of
those mechanisms.
Modifying the general pattern of interaction between the ECJ
and national courts therefore does not seem to be a good solution and
the ECJ itself does not appear to find it very attractive either. In a
recent decision concerning the position of the Austrian Constitutional
Court, it did not go any further than in Melki and Abdeli.144 Unlike the
Advocate General,145 the ECJ left open whether the reasoning, based
on EU law, which led the Austrian Constitutional Court to establish a
duty of ordinary courts to refer to it, was correct. However, the
possibility for the latter courts to seize the ECJ first and await its
answer, by which the Constitutional Court will also be bound, would
seem to deprive the Constitutional Court of the first say in those
142. In 2014, of the slightly over thirty preliminary references decided by the Grand
Chamber of the Court (an indication that the ECJ considered the questions to be of particular
importance or difficulty), less than one-third came from courts of last instance. Only two came
from constitutional courts. The reference in Åkerberg Fransson came from the Haparanda
Tingsrätt, a district court in a town of around 5000 inhabitants on the Finnish border.
Admittedly, some national constitutional courts may have preferred that reference never to
have been made, but it seems difficult to deny the constitutional significance of the questions
submitted to the ECJ.
143. See Monica Claes & Maartje de Visser, The Court of Justice as a Federal
Constitutional Court: A Comparative Perspective, in FEDERALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
83 (Elke Cloots et al. eds., 2012).
144. A v. B and Others, Case C-112/13, [2014] E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Sept. 11, 2014)
(not yet reported).
145. Opinion of Advocate General Bot, A v. B and Others, Case C-112/13, [2014]
E.C.R. I_____ (delivered Apr. 2, 2014).
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cases, which may have been an important driving factor for that court
to hold that ordinary courts were under a duty to refer to it.
CONCLUSION
In the early days of European integration, the EU’s minimal
protection of fundamental rights was an argument often invoked
against the claim of absolute primacy of EU law over national law.
Today, too much protection of fundamental rights by the EU is
invoked as a threat to the constitutional identity of the Member States
and, as a consequence, also as a potential reason to reject the primacy
of EU law.146 There are, however, no compelling reasons why the
ECJ should change its course significantly. The risk that, in pursuing
the current course of action, it might crush the vibrant development of
fundamental rights at the national level seems less important on closer
inspection than it may appear at first glance and can be countered by a
sufficiently flexible approach that the ECJ has so far been quite
willing to take.

146. Angela Ward has already pointed to this irony. See Ward, supra note 12, at
¶ 51.123.

